By Anwarulhaq Baig
NEW DELHI: In a major setback for the Muslim side, the Allahabad High Court has rejected objections raised by Muslim parties regarding the maintainability of 18 suits filed by Hindu claimants in the Mathura’s Shahi Idgah Masjid and Krishna Janmabhoomi dispute.
On Thursday, the Allahabad High Court’s single-judge bench of Justice Mayank Kumar Jain dismissed applications filed by the mosque management committee and Uttar Pradesh Sunni Central Waqf Board seeking rejection of the Hindu plaintiffs’ suits, paving the way for the case to proceed to trial.
Mathura’s Shahi Idgah Masjid, over 400 years old, is central to a dispute between Hindu and Muslim groups. The Hindu parties claim that the mosque was constructed on land believed to be the birthplace of Lord Krishna, while the Muslim side rejects these assertions. Multiple suits have been filed by Hindu groups seeking the removal of the mosque and transfer of the land to Hindu ownership.
The Hindu parties contend that the mosque was originally a Hindu temple. In December 2023, the Allahabad High Court permitted an inspection of the mosque by a court commissioner, but the Supreme Court later stayed this order.
The case transferred from the trial court to the High Court in 2023, has a complex history of proceedings. It was initially dismissed by a civil court in September 2020, citing the bar on such cases under the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991. However, this dismissal was overturned by the Mathura District Court in May 2022, which ruled that the suit was maintainable.
In the Allahabad High Court, advocates representing the Hindu plaintiffs include Vishnu Jain and Devki Nandan Sharma, while the Muslim defendants are represented by Tasneem Ahmadi and Nasiruzzaman.
What Hindu plaintiffs sought?
The Hindu plaintiffs put forth several key arguments in their suits before the Allahabad High Court. The Hindu side is seeking multiple reliefs, including:
1. Cancellation of previous judgments and decrees related to the disputed site.
2. A declaration that 13.37 acres of Katra Keshav Dev land belongs to the deity Shree Krishna Virajman.
3. Removal of existing structures (referring to the Shahi Idgah Masjid) from the land.
4. Handing over vacant possession of the property to the Shri Krishna Janmbhoomi Trust.
5. Prohibitory injunctions against the Muslim defendants from entering or interfering with the premises.
In one particular suit, the Hindu parties have sought a declaration that the entire premises belong to the Hindu deities, and have requested permission to construct a new temple after demolishing existing Muslim worship places.
Muslim Side’s Key Arguments
The Muslim defendants, including the Shahi Idgah Masjid management committee and the Uttar Pradesh Sunni Central Waqf Board, had raised several objections to the maintainability of the Hindu suits. Their counsel, led by senior advocate Tasneem Ahmadi, argued forcefully that the suits were barred under various laws and should be rejected at the threshold.
Bar Under Places of Worship Act
A key contention of the Muslim side was that the suits were barred under the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991. This law prohibits conversion of any place of worship as it existed on August 15, 1947, and provides for maintenance of the “religious character” of places of worship as of that date.
Mrs. Ahmadi argued that as per the plaintiffs’ admission, the Shahi Idgah Mosque was constructed by Mughal emperor Aurangzeb in 1669-70 and has existed since then. She contended that the property continues to be utilized as a mosque even today, with regular prayers being offered.
“The religious character of the disputed property as a mosque is evident based on government notifications from 1920 as well as admissions in the plaintiffs’ plaints,” Mrs. Ahmadi told the court. She argued that no mixed question of fact and law was involved, as the religious character was clear from the nomenclature and continuous use of the property as a mosque.
The Muslim side also cited a 1944 government gazette notification listing the property as “Idgah Masjid Aalmgiri”, contending this established its status as a waqf property. They argued that changing its religious character from a mosque to a temple would be expressly barred by the 1991 Act.
Limitation Bar
Another significant objection raised was that the suits were barred by limitation. Mrs. Ahmadi argued that the cause of action, if any, had arisen between 1968-1974 when physical changes were made to the property following a compromise decree.
“These physical developments could not have been hidden from the plaintiffs. They cannot claim ignorance about the compromise which they could have known by exercise of reasonable diligence,” she contended. Citing Articles 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act which prescribe a three-year limitation period, she pointed out that the present suits have been filed after over 50 years.
The Muslim side also argued that the claims made in the petition disclosed only an “illusory cause of action” created by the Hindu plaintiffs. Mrs. Ahmadi termed the chain of events pleaded in the petition as amounting to the creation of an artificial cause of action, unsupported by any cogent evidence.
Bar Under Waqf Act
The Muslim side also contended that the civil court had no jurisdiction to hear the matter as it related to a waqf property. Citing provisions of the Waqf Act 1995, they argued that only the Waqf Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes related to waqf properties.
“Section 85 of the Waqf Act bars jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of any dispute, question or matter relating to any waqf property,” Mrs. Ahmadi submitted. She argued that as the plaintiffs had themselves arrayed the Waqf Board as a defendant, they had admitted the waqf nature of the property.
The Muslim side also relied on a recent Supreme Court judgment in the case of Rashid Wali Beg vs. Farid Pindari to contend that jurisdiction for every dispute relating to a waqf property lies only with the Waqf Tribunal.
Challenge to the 1968 Compromise Barred
The Muslim side argued that the challenge to the 1968 compromise decree in an earlier suit (No. 43 of 1967) was barred under Order XXIII Rule 3A of the Civil Procedure Code. This provision bars any suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which it was based was not lawful.
Mrs. Ahmadi submitted that the title and possession of the Shahi Idgah Masjid were settled based on the terms of the 1968 compromise. Therefore, she argued, any challenge to it could only be made in the same proceedings and not by filing fresh suits.
“The provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3A impose an express bar on such proceedings,” she contended. The Muslim side argued that respected personalities had joined as plaintiffs in the 1967 suit and put their signatures on the compromise deed. Therefore, it could not be assumed that the compromise was based on fraud or misrepresentation.
Bar Under Specific Relief Act
The Muslim side also cited Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act to argue that the suits were not maintainable. They contended that since the plaintiffs were admittedly not in possession of the disputed property, they could not seek only declaratory relief without asking for possession.
“The plaintiffs have filed suits seeking reliefs for declaration and injunction only and have not sought a decree of possession. A mere declaration of title is not enough. They must seek delivery of possession,” Mrs. Ahmadi argued.
She submitted that since the mosque committee was in possession of the suit property, the further relief would be recovery of possession. Therefore, a suit for mere declaration of title was not maintainable under the Specific Relief Act.
Other Arguments
The Muslim side also contended that the Ancient Monuments Preservation Act 1904, under which the property was declared a protected monument in 1920, had been repealed. Therefore, they argued, the plaintiffs could not rely on those notifications.
They submitted that the 1944 waqf notification conclusively established the waqf nature of the property. Mrs. Ahmadi argued that changing its character from a mosque to a temple would be barred not just by the Places of Worship Act but also by waqf laws.
The Muslim also pointed out that in several rounds of litigation prior to 1967, it was never pleaded that the property was a temple. They argued this showed the recent suits were an afterthought.
Court Rejects Muslim Objections
After extensive hearings on both sides, Justice Mayank Kumar Jain rejected all the objections raised by the Muslim defendants. On the Places of Worship Act argument, he observed that the law does not define “religious character” and does not bar the determination of the religious character of a place of worship by courts.
“The religious character of the place of worship is the determinative factor for deciding the applicability of the provisions of the Act of 1991 over a property,” Justice Jain noted. He ruled that determining the religious character in this case was a mixed question of fact and law that could only be decided after framing of issues and leading of evidence during trial.
The judge did not accept the limitation argument, observing that the question of limitation was directly related to the cause of action pleaded by the plaintiffs. He ruled this could only be examined fully based on evidence led during the trial.
On the waqf argument, Justice Jain noted that the defendants had not produced any document to show the property was ever called “Idgah Masjid Aalmgiri” as claimed. He observed that the 1944 notification prima facie did not appear to relate to the suit property.
“At this stage, it cannot be assumed that the suit property was notified as a ‘waqf property’ under this Notification,” the judge held. He ruled that the question of the Waqf Tribunal’s jurisdiction did not arise at this stage.
The court also rejected the argument on the 1968 compromise, ruling that since the present plaintiffs were not parties to that suit, they were not barred from challenging it now. On the Specific Relief Act point, Justice Jain noted that as per the plaints, the plaintiffs claim they were in possession “since time immemorial” and their ouster was not admitted.
While rejecting the Muslim side’s objections, Justice Jain clarified that his observations were prima facie in nature. He emphasized that all facts and circumstances would be subject to the appreciation of evidence led by both sides during the trial.
The judge has now listed the matter for August 12, 2024, for framing of issues. This means the suits will now proceed to trial, where both sides will get an opportunity to produce evidence in support of their respective claims.
The dispute has shades of similarity with the Babri Masjid-Ayodhya Ram Janmabhoomi case, where the Supreme Court in 2019 handed over the disputed site for construction of a Ram temple. However, key differences remain – particularly the existence of the Places of Worship Act which was passed in 1991 while the Ayodhya case was already sub-judice.
The ruling is a setback for the Muslim side, which had hoped to get the suits dismissed at the preliminary stage itself. They can now challenge this order before the Supreme Court.
Experts and community leaders react that the Mathura case could end up testing the constitutional validity of the Places of Worship Act itself. Even the law has been challenged before the Supreme Court recently.
