The Constitution (130th Amendment) Bill, 2025 proposes automatic removal from office for the Prime Minister, Chief Ministers, and Ministers if they are arrested and detained in custody for 30 consecutive days for offences carrying a prison term of five years or more.
By Prof (Dr) Ghulam Yazdani*
NEW DELHI: The Constitution (One Hundred and Thirtieth Amendment) Bill, 2025 seeks to address a long-standing concern in Indian democracy — the criminalisation of politics. By providing for the removal of the Prime Minister, Chief Ministers and Ministers who remain in custody for 30 consecutive days for offences punishable with imprisonment of five years or more, the Bill attempts to introduce higher standards of political accountability. While its objective is laudable, the proposed mechanism raises fundamental constitutional questions that merit careful deliberation.
The proposed amendment extends across all levels of executive government. It amends Article 75 governing the Union executive, Article 164 relating to the States, and Article 239AA governing the National Capital Territory of Delhi. Parallel legislation has also been introduced for the Union Territories of Puducherry and Jammu and Kashmir, reflecting an attempt to establish a uniform constitutional standard.
At the Union level, the proposed Article 75(5A) provides that where a Union Minister is arrested and remains in custody for thirty consecutive days in connection with an offence punishable with imprisonment of five years or more, the President shall remove the Minister on the advice of the Prime Minister, which must be tendered by the thirty-first day. If such advice is not given within the prescribed period, the Minister automatically ceases to hold office. In the case of the Prime Minister, the proposal is more stringent. The Prime Minister
must resign by the thirty-first day of such detention, failing which he or she automatically ceases to hold office.
A similar framework is proposed for the States through Article 164(4A) and for Delhi under Article 239AA, requiring resignation or automatic cessation of office after thirty consecutive days of custody. Significantly, the Bill does not create a permanent disqualification. It expressly permits the reappointment of the Prime Minister, Chief Minister or Minister after release from custody.
Risk of Executive Instability
The proposal, therefore, creates a temporary executive disability rather than a lasting constitutional bar. Once custody ends, the ordinary constitutional process of appointment may restore the individual to office. A Chief Minister who is removed after thirty-one days in custody, for instance, may again be appointed by the Governor after securing the requisite legislative support upon release.
A major concern with this bill is the possibility of a vacancy in high constitutional offices if a Minister, Chief Minister, or the Prime Minister is forced to leave office after thirty days of custody, because even a temporary absence can disrupt administration and weaken continuity in governance. In a parliamentary system, executive stability matters, and repeated removals
may create uncertainty in the functioning of the Council of Ministers, especially when the office involved is that of the Chief Minister or Prime Minister. The bill does allow reappointment after release from custody, but until that happens, the office remains vacant and political arrangements become fragile.
A Tool To Unsettle Elected Governments
Another serious issue is the risk of misuse through false or politically motivated cases. Since the trigger is arrest and detention, not conviction, a leader could be removed even before guilt is proved, and that creates a real danger in a highly polarized political environment. If criminal process is used strategically to place opponents in custody, the bill could become a tool for weakening elected governments rather than improving integrity. This is why critics
may argue that the measure, though aimed at clean governance, may also punish political office-holders before judicial determination, which raises fairness and due process concerns.
The possibility of misuse also cannot be ignored. In an intensely competitive political environment, criminal proceedings may occasionally become instruments of political strategy. Since the Bill operates solely based on arrest and detention, without any judicial finding regarding the merits of the allegations, there remains a legitimate apprehension that politically motivated prosecutions could be used to unsettle elected governments. Constitutional safeguards must therefore ensure that the objective of clean governance does not become vulnerable to abuse of criminal process.
Equally important is the nature of the vacancy created by the Bill. The proposal does not prescribe any fixed period during which the office must remain vacant. The vacancy exists only until a fresh constitutional appointment is made. For Ministers, this would ordinarily involve prompt advice by the Prime Minister or Chief Minister followed by appointment by the President or Governor. For the office of the Prime Minister or Chief Minister, the vacancy would continue only until another leader commanding legislative confidence is appointed.
The bill does not require the office to remain vacant for a minimum number of days, nor does it create a cooling-off period before reappointment. It only says that after release from custody, the same person may be appointed again, which means the vacancy may be short if the political executive acts quickly, or longer if there is delay in forming the next appointment.
From a constitutional law perspective, this is a temporary vacancy mechanism, not a permanent disqualification. The purpose is to prevent a person from continuing in office while in prolonged custody, but the Constitution still allows continuity of government through fresh appointment, which is essential for executive efficiency.
Linking Office to Judicial Custody
India’s constitutional framework presently disqualifies legislators primarily upon conviction under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Consequently, an individual facing grave criminal charges may continue to occupy ministerial office until judicial proceedings conclude, a process that often spans several years. The proposed amendment seeks to bridge
this accountability gap by linking continuation in executive office to prolonged judicial custody rather than conviction. In doing so, it responds to repeated concerns expressed by constitutional bodies, the Election Commission and the judiciary regarding the growing criminalisation of electoral politics.
Yet, the means adopted by the Bill are as significant as its ends. The automatic cessation of office after 30 days of detention, without any judicial determination of guilt or even the framing of charges, sits uneasily with constitutional guarantees. Arrest is an investigative measure; it is neither proof of culpability nor a judicial finding that the accused deserves punishment. The presumption of innocence remains a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence and an essential component of the rule of law.
Risks to Democratic Governance
The proposal also invites scrutiny under the basic structure doctrine evolved in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973). In a parliamentary democracy, the continuance of a government depends upon the confidence of the elected legislature. If the tenure of a Prime Minister or Chief Minister can effectively be terminated because of prolonged detention, investigative agencies may acquire an indirect influence over the stability of elected governments. Such an outcome raises concerns relating to parliamentary democracy, separation of powers and federalism, particularly where agencies controlled by one level of government investigate functionaries of another.
Supporters of the Bill argue that constitutional morality demands higher ethical standards from those occupying public office. The Supreme Court in Manoj Narula v. Union of India (2014) emphasised that constitutional functionaries should uphold integrity and probity, even where the law does not expressly prohibit appointment. Public confidence in democratic institutions undoubtedly requires that those entrusted with executive power remain beyond reasonable suspicion.
A Constitutionally Sustainable Approach
The question, however, is not whether accountability should be strengthened, but how it should be achieved. A more constitutionally sustainable approach may be to introduce consequences after the framing of charges by a competent court in offences of a serious nature, a stage involving judicial scrutiny rather than executive discretion. Fast-tracking criminal trials involving elected representatives, strengthening disclosure requirements and ensuring independent investigations would further the objective of decriminalising politics without unsettling constitutional balances.
The Bill has rightly been referred to a Joint Parliamentary Committee. Its deliberations offer an opportunity to reconcile two equally compelling constitutional values — ethical governance and democratic legitimacy. Any reform intended to cleanse public life must itself remain faithful to the constitutional principles that define the Republic.
*The author is Dean, Faculty of Law, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.

