Karnataka High Court: Giving Preference To Personal Opinion Over Hadith In The Hijab Case

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Syed Khalique Ahmed

NEW DELHI—Shall the personal opinion of a Tafseer (exegesis) writer in the footnotes to the verses of the Quran without being backed by valid sources of Islamic jurisprudence enjoy precedence over Hadith, or Ahadith in plural? (Ahadith are the collection of traditions containing sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, which form the major source of guidance for Muslims, apart from the Quran. Therefore, Hadith possesses the second position in Islamic theology after the Quran.)

Can personal opinion in the form of a footnote in the explanation of the Quran be given preference in arriving at a judgment by outrightly rejecting the Hadith? This has happened in the Hijab case decided by the Karnataka High Court that attracted international headlines. 

The footnote 3767 to verse 59 and footnote 3768 of verse 60 of Surah Al-Ahzaab in the “Holy Quran: Text, Translation and Commentary” by Abdullah Yusuf Ali tries to convey the message that Hijab was prescribed by the Quran when Muslim women going out of their houses were harassed and molested by hypocrites. Hypocrites are called “false Muslims”. The Quran condemns them as outwardly Muslims who conceal disbelief in their hearts and actively try to subvert the Muslim community and Islam.

The particular analysis in the context of Hijab mentioned by Ali in his exegesis and other arguments became the primary reason for the court to declare that the Hijab is not an essential or integral practice of Islam. 

ALSO READ: Hijab Row: Why Did The Karnataka High Court Judges Rely Only On Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s Commentary On The Quran?

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According to Ali, the Hijab is a practice linked to socio-cultural conditions and intends to provide security and safety to women when moving out of their homes. And hence, the practice of Hijab can be dispensed with when the socio-cultural conditions do not threaten the safety and security of women. 

This is a view advanced by Ali, which has no backing from the Hadith. There is also no ‘ijma’ or consensus on this opinion of Ali, either among the Companions of the Prophet or Muslim scholars who wrote Islamic jurisprudence after that. 

 But even then, the court accepted Ali’s opinion and rejected two Ahadith in support of Hijab. While the narrator of one Hadith is Hazrat Aisha, one of the wives of the Prophet, the narrator in the other Hadith is Safiyya bint Shaiba. The petitioners quoted both the Hadith to support their arguments that Hijab is an essential practice in Islam.

These Hadith were quoted from Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan’s book: “The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih Al-Bukhari, Arabic-English’, Volume 6. It has been published by Darussalam Publications, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Darussalam publication is considered the most authentic publisher of Islamic literature globally.

The court rejected the Hadith saying that the petitioners have not submitted the credentials of Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan, even though the first page of the book introduces him as “Formerly Director, University Hospital, Islamic University, Al-Madina Al Munawwara, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

“By this, credentials required for a commentator cannot be assumed, ” reads the judgment on page number 72. It means that the credentials mentioned in the book are without proof, and the court cannot take them for granted.

However, the high court found a reference of Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan in a decision of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court. “Even here, no credentials are discussed nor is anything stated about the authenticity and reliability of his version of Ahadith,” the judgment points out on Page 72.

However, at the same time, the court banked upon Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s version of the translation of the Quran and his commentary (published by Goodword Books, 2019 reprint) for deciding if Hijab is an essential practice in the religion of Islam. The question arises: What is the authenticity and reliability of Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s translation and commentary? Only Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s version was selected when petitioners’ advocates had cited versions of other Quranic commentators like Abdul Haleem, Muhammad Taqiuddin al-Hilali, Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan, and Dr. Mohammad Mahmoud Ghali also. Oxford University Press has published Abdul Haleem’s exegesis. He was a Professor of Islamic Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. Al-Hilali, a Moroccan Muslim, worked as head of Arabic studies at Darul Uloom Nadwatul Ulema at Lucknow. Al-Hilali also taught and led the prayers at Masjid-e-Nabawi, the second holiest site of Islam. He also taught at Masjid al-Haram in Mecca, Islam’s most sacred site. The translation and commentary of the Quran by Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan and Al-Hilali is printed and distributed by the Government of Saudi Arabia. Dr. Muhammad Muhsin Khan was of Afghan origin. An Egyptian, Dr. Ghali was a product of the University of Exeter, the United Kingdom, and worked as a professor of Islamic Studies at Cairo’s Al-Azhar University.

But what is the background of Abdullah Yusuf Ali? Ali worked as an Indian Civil Service (ICS) officer and supported the British in the First World War though he opposed the Britishers against bringing down the Turkish Khilafat. He also worked as principal of Islamia College at Lahore, now in Pakistan. However, he never taught Islamic or Arabic subjects in any institution.

While people may differ, the Karnataka High Court, in its wisdom, decided in favour of Abdullah Yusuf Ali only. Let’s see what the Karnataka high court says about selecting Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s version of the Quranic commentary? One of the reasons offered by the court is that “there is broad unanimity at the Bar as to its authenticity and reliability. The speculative and generalizing mind of this author views the verses of the scriptures in their proper perspective. He provides the unifying principles that underlie. His monumental work has systematic completeness and perfection of form.” The question is: Who at the Bar has read the translations of Abdullah Yusuf Ali and other authors? If they have not read it and don’t understand the Quran and Islam, how can their recommendation or approval be accepted in such a sensitive case? The court also offers excerpts from Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s ‘Preface to the First Edition’ supporting its decision. The passages speak about the uniqueness of Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s translation and commentary. In fact, every author mentions the broad points of their work in the preface. 

The second reason the high court has relied upon Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s work is that the Supreme Court, in a chain of similar cases, has treated Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s book as the “authoritative work.” For example, in Shayara Bano’s case about the Triple Talaq, the Supreme Court relied on Abdullah Yusuf Ali’s book. 

Another reason, according to the bench, is that “none at the Bar has disputed the profound scholarship of this writer (Abdullah Yusuf Ali) or authenticity of his commentary. We, too, find the construction of and the comments on Surahs and Verses of the scripture illuminative and immensely appealing to reason and justice.”

While rejecting the translations and commentaries of other authors, the court should have given its reasons either after reading them, or based on comments of experts. But this aspect is missing from the court discussions about why the other authors were rejected.

From the bench, we need to ask: Are those at the Bar expert in Islamic theology, particularly exegesis of the Quran, whose recommendations can be relied upon? Are the judges forming part of the bench experts in Islam and explaining the Quran? On what basis do they claim that the comments of the author appeal to their “reason and justice?” Did the judges read the commentaries by other writers, and did they find them less authentic and scholarly? 

One more question arises. Should the judges have decided on religion when they don’t know about it? The courts have adopted the practice of appointing amicus to assist the court in such a situation. Why did the court not appoint an amicus in this case when the court found that no Maulana’s opinion or affidavit was on record? The court could have at least sought the opinion or affidavit of a Muslim scholar and an Islamic expert belonging to the Muslim community or called upon All India Muslim Personal Law Board, a qualified and special body, to assist the court in order to do justice and also seen as doing justice. Surprisingly, the court did not do that and took the role of being an Islamic expert and decided that Hijab is not essential to Islam.

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